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DIGITAL EVIDENCE EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS OF LAW
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Barbara Endicott-Popovsky
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4311 11th Ave NE Suite 400 Box 354985
Seattle, Washington 98105
aalva@uw.edu, endicott@uw.edu
ABSTRACT
An examination of State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero provides insight into how a general lack of
understanding of digital evidence can cause an innocent defendant to be wrongfully convicted. By
contrast, the 101-page opinion in Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. provides legal
precedence and a detailed consideration for the admission of digital evidence. An analysis of both
cases leads the authors to recommend additions to Law School curricula designed to raise the
awareness of the legal community to ensure such travesties of justice, as in the Amero case, don’t
occur in the future. Work underway at the University of Washington designed to address this
deficiency is discussed.
Keywords: digital forensics, law education, ESI, admissibility, evidence
1. INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND
There is an alarming gap in the legal and judicial community’s understanding of digital evidence. This
was brought home vividly after one of the authors received a call from an attorney acquaintance
seeking advice on a case involving incriminating emails that were pending admission as evidence in a
contentious divorce case. The accused wife was an injured Iraqi War veteran whose husband sought
dissolution, as well as all of the couple’s assets and full custody of their children, based on her alleged
crimes of cyber stalking. As evidence, the husband’s lawyer provided paper copies to the judge of
incriminating emails that did indeed appear to emanate from the wife’s account. Without legal
challenge, the judge was inclined to admit it. Endicott-Popovsky recommended that the related digital
email files be requested from the husband’s lawyer, who agreed to forward them immediately. Three
weeks later, the digital email files still were not forthcoming and the lawyer--and his client—dropped
the allegations against the wife of violation of Washington State’s strict cyber stalking statutes and
withdrew the ”evidence” from the judge’s consideration. You can draw your own conclusion why this
“evidence,” initially so compelling according to the other side, was quietly withdrawn.
This entire episode gave pause. Had the wife’s attorney not known of one Author’s interest in digital
forensics, he might not have called. Had the judge then admitted the evidence proposed by the
husband’s counsel, a serious miscarriage of justice almost surely would have ensued. The tragedy of a
veteran of active duty service, and a woman at that, officially being labeled a cyberstalker, stripped of
her parental rights and losing her assets (not to mention the effect that this would have on the children)
was chilling to contemplate and reminiscent of the Julie Amero case which has become a legend
among digital forensics experts and which will be discussed in more detail later. Examination of
additional cases confirms this experience, resulting in our recommendation that education in a range of
subjects related to digital evidence be added to law school curricula where, unfortunately, today it
often is not.
Failing to provide lawyers and judges with sufficient education in digital evidence can result in serious
miscarriages of justice and disruption of the legal system. The innocent will be wrongly convicted and
incarcerated; those deserving of punishment will get away with crimes. Society as a whole would be
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better served by increasing the legal and judiciary communities’ understanding of digital evidence
(Endicott-Popovsky and Horowitz 2012). This will require that schools of law an engage in an effort
to identify what needs to be taught.
2. STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. JULIE AMERO
State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero exposed how legal ignorance of digital evidence could have a
profound impact on an individual’s life. Defendant, Amero was convicted on four charges of Risk of
Injury to a Child, which carried up to a 40-year sentence (Kantor 2007). Following four delays in
sentencing, a new trial was granted when the conviction was overturned on appeal. After years of
suffering under a cloud of suspicion, wanting to put the nightmare behind her, Amero pled guilty to
disorderly conduct, her teaching license was revoked, and she paid a $100 fine (Krebs 2008).
To summarize the facts of the case, Julie Amero was substitute-teaching a seventh grade classroom on
October 19, 2004. After stepping out of the hallway for a moment, she found two students browsing a
hairstyling site. Shortly afterwards, the computer browser began continuously opening pop-ups with
pornographic content. She was explicitly told not to turn off the computer, and was unaware that the
monitor could be shut off. Students were exposed to the pornography. The primary evidence admitted
by the court was the forensic duplicate of the hard drive on the computer in question. While the
forensic investigator did not use industry standards to duplicate the hard drive, the information was
used in the investigation (Eckelberry et al. 2007). The evidence purported to show Internet history of
pornographic links that indicated the user deliberately went to those sites (Amero Trial Testimony
2007).
Later pro bono forensics experts for the defendant showed that antivirus definitions were not updated
regularly and at the time were at least three months out-of-date. Additionally, no antispyware or client
firewall was installed and the school's content filter had expired (Eckelberry et al. 2007).
2.1 Evaluation of digital evidence by Judge and attorneys
During the trial, the judge refused to allow full testimony from the defense expert witness Herb
Horner, noting that the information was not made available beforehand. That information was relevant
to gaining a full understanding of the digital evidence crucial to the case. The decision not to admit it
indicates a troubling lack of understanding of the nature of digital evidence. Horner’s evidence should
have been provided to the jury (Amero Trial Testimony 2007).
Maintaining a digital chain of evidence is essential for admissibility of any digital evidence. In State v.
Amero, this is questionable based on the uncertainty of the forensic duplicate process (Eckelberry et al.
2007). Additionally, timestamp differences between the e-mail server (the time authority in the school
system’s network), and the computer in question, as a witness stated, “was ten or twelve minutes. I
don't remember who was faster and who was slower” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Both of these
discrepancies should put into question the authenticity of the digital evidence, although neither arose
as a strong defense argument. This indicates that the attorneys did not have sufficient technical
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
Further, the judge did not find relevant the preparations taken by one expert witness to examine the
hard drive forensically. This is necessary to provide foundation for admissibility and authenticity of
digital evidence (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). The defense attorney did not question authenticity
based on the time stamp differences between PC and server, nor did the defense make an argument
regarding the process of the forensic investigation. Similarly, the prosecution did not have a proper
understanding of how to show the digital evidence in ways consistent with the actual event, as seen by
their display of full size pornographic pictures instead of thumbnails.
On the basis of the transcript of the case, the questions attorneys asked (or did not ask) of witnesses
also indicated low computer literacy. While expert witnesses are important to the case, the technical
knowledge of the attorneys (with the judge’s permission) guided the questioning of the witnesses.
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The prosecuting attorney, when questioning the defense expert witness, apparently did not understand
the information being provided. A lack of understanding on the attorney’s part resulted in a lack of
precision in direct questioning that could have elicited more meaningful answers from the witness.
The following dialogue between the prosecuting attorney (questioning) and the defense expert witness
is an example:
Q So in order for it to show up on the temporary Internet files, that person would have to actively
go to that site, correct? They were not redirected to that site, correct?
A Wrong.
Q Okay.
A You don’t understand.
Q I hear you saying that.Give me more questions. (Amero Trial Testimony 2007)
One line of questioning by the defense regarded computer functions related to the Internet, adware,
spyware, and viruses (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Cross-examination containing phrases such as
‘parasites’ and other incompetent questioning further displayed a low level of computer literacy from
attorneys on both sides. When the prosecutor displayed full-size pornographic pictures in the
courtroom, the defense did not argue, as it should have, that the relative size of the pictures displayed
for the jury was not consistent with the pop-up size thumbnails displayed in the classroom. The lack of
a specific argument by the defense against using a full size display in the courtroom contributed to a
false impression that prejudiced the jury (Willard 2007).
2.2 Expert witness testimony
The following section will detail the expert witness testimony in the Julie Amero case.
2.2.1 Bob Hartz, IT Manager
This case heard several expert witnesses, each of whom provided information that proved to be
misleading. The jury heard testimony from Bob Hartz, IT Manager for the Norwich Public Schools
first. Hartz’s testimony provided information on server logs that provided a history of sites accessed
from the computer in question. His testimony also provided a basic understanding of the computer
environment at the School district, including notice that the timestamps between server/firewall logs
and the computer were either 10-12 minutes ahead or behind. Additionally, he testified that the content
filtering was not working, as it “had not been updated correctly” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007).
During Hartz’s testimony, he was asked a series of questions regarding the possibility of certain events
occurring, based on his 20-plus years of experience in the field. His answers provided misleading
information. When asked if it were possible to be in an ‘endless loop of pornography,’ referring to the
continual pornographic popups, Hartz stated, “I've never seen that, so I would have to say probably
not” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Additionally, when asked whether spyware and adware generates
pornography, Hartz replied, “I’m not aware they do” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Both of these
replies were speculative and should have been challenged, along with his experience to respond
competently to questions involving malicious activity on the Internet.
2.2.1 Detective Mark Lounsbury
Detective Mark Lounsbury, the computer crimes officer for the Norwich Police Department, was the
officer who personally copied and examined the hard drive. From testimony given by Lounsbury, it
appears that he may have investigated the original hard drive rather than the copy he claimed to have
made. Best practice is to preserve the original hard drive for evidentiary purposes, and to perform the
investigation on the forensic duplicate (Noblett, Pollitt, et al. 2000). Any digital forensic expert should
know that direct access to the hard drive, including opening files, will alter the files from the original
state—which in turn alters the evidence.
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Another revealing insight into the incompetence of Lounsbury’s hard drive examination was revealed
in his answer to the question, “Did you examine the hard drive for spyware, adware, viruses or
parasites?” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007) He responded that he had not. Digital forensics best
practices include examination for event correlation that searches for causes of activities in question
(NIST 800-61 2008). It is safe to say that poor examination procedures, led to missed findings that
were directly relevant to the case.
2.2.2 Herb Horner, defense expert witness
Herb Horner, a self-employed computer consultant, was called in by the defense as an expert witness.
Horner obtained the hard drive copy from the police, and then created copies for his investigation.
Horner’s testimony was cut short by the judge’s decision not to continue with information that was not
provided beforehand to the prosecution. Horner later stated, "This was one of the most frustrating
experiences of my career, knowing full well that the person is innocent and not being allowed to
provide logical proof. If there is an appeal and the defense is allowed to show the entire results of the
forensic examination in front of experienced computer people, including a computer literate judge and
prosecutor, Julie Amero will walk out the court room as a free person." (Kantor 2007). The
information that was to be presented by Horner was evidence of spyware on the computer, which was
caused pornographic pop-ups (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). As Horner stated to the judge while the
jury was dismissed, “there were things done before the 19th that led to this catastrophe, and this is a
fact” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Despite this, evidence that spyware caused the pop-ups still was
not allowed into the record.
2.3 Legal results
Legal precedence cited in State v. Amero was limited. There was one mention of U.S. v. Frye during
an objection to the admissibility of expert testimony by Hartz on the basis that he did not lay proper
foundation for his testimony (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). The prosecution argued that the Hartz’s
expertise was based on his described twenty years of experience, and the judge found this sufficient
(Amero Trial Testimony 2007).
During the same exchange, the defense cited State v. Porter to argue that the reliability of scientific
information was a major issue. In State v. Porter, the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the Federal
standard set by U.S. v. Daubert, however, questioning continued due to lack of clarity on what the
defense was objecting to specifically (Amero Trial Testimony 2007).
The primary law cited in this case was risk of injury to a minor, Connecticut General Statute Section
53-21(a)(1), from which the charges stemmed. There were no laws or regulations cited relevant to
digital evidence admissibility.
The defendant was found guilty on four counts of Risk of Injury to a Child, with the possibility of a
40-year prison sentence. After four delays in sentencing, the State Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court decision and a motion for a new trial was accepted. She pled guilty to a misdemeanor to get the
nightmare behind her. As part of the deal, she agreed to have her teaching license revoked. The
emotional toll on her and her family was extreme, and the stress of trial resulted in many health
problems. She has become a cause celebre for digital forensics experts ever since.
3. LORRIANE V. MARKEL AM. INS. CO.
There are a few examples where the justice system has properly handled the admission of digital
evidence. We transition from an example of glaring misunderstandings and lack of knowledge of
digital evidence (Amero case), to an analysis of a competent judicial opinion regarding digital
evidence, the case of Lorriane v. Markel American Insurance Company. The opinion proceeding from
the ruling made by Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm has set major legal
precedence (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). The case arose from an insurance payment dispute. The
actual facts of the case are not important; the opinion of Judge Grimm is. It provides a detailed
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procedure for admitting digital evidence. The following section will summarize each step and
requirement of the process.
3.1 Digital evidence admissibility process
The first criteria for gauging admissibility of digital evidence is based on Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 104. Judge Grimm explained that determining the authenticity of Electronically Stored
Information (ESI) is a two-step process (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). First,
“...before admitting evidence for consideration by the jury, the district court must determine
whether its proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably
find that the evidence is authentic” (Lorraine v. Markel Am. quoting U.S. v. Branch).
Secondly,
“...because authentication is essentially a question of conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately
resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which the proponent
claims” (Lorraine v. Markel Am. quoting U.S. v. Branch).
Relevance is the first requirement for admissibility of evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 401). Evidence is
sufficient, in terms of relevance, if it has “…any tendency’ to prove or disprove a consequential fact in
litigation” (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). Of importance, if evidence is not relevant, it is never
admissible according to Fed. R. Evid 402. In terms of the case at hand, Lorraine, the emails were
determined to be relevant to the case (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007).
The next step in determining admissibility of ESI is its authenticity as guided by Federal Rules of
Evidence 901 and 902. Judge Grimm submits that the authenticity of digital evidence is an important
requirement, and that the degree of admissibility only need be sufficient in terms of showing the
evidence is what it is purported to be (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). Specifically, the non-exclusive
examples provided by Rule 901(b) can be studied to know how to address authentication of ESI in
Rule 901(a) (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007).
Federal Rules of Evidence 902 shows twelve non-exclusive methods that can be used for ‘selfauthentication’ of digital evidence (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007):

(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed.
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and Certified.
(3) Foreign Public Documents.
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records.
(5) Official Publications.
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like.
(8) Acknowledged Documents.
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents.
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute.
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.
These methods establish a practice of authentication that can be performed without the need for expert
witness testimony, although the lack of such testimony does not exempt evidence of authentication
from challenge (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007; Fed. R. Evid. 902).
Procedurally, evidence that is already deemed relevant and authentic must also withstand any
argument of hearsay. Rule 801 governs hearsay, and states that electronic writings or other
information generated entirely by a “computerized system or process” is not made by a person, and
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therefore cannot be considered hearsay (Lorraine v. Markel Am., 2007). There are exemptions to the
hearsay rule within the Federal Rules of Evidence, which Judge Grimm linked to ESI in his opinion.
These included Fed. R. Evid. 803(1-3, 6, 7, 17) (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007).
The Original Writing Rule is considered the next hurdle for electronic evidence admissibility, which is
included in Federal Rules of Evidence 1001-1008. Rule 1002 ensures the ‘best evidence’ available and
applies when a “writing, recording or photograph is being introduced to ‘prove the context of a
writing, recording or paragraph’” (Fed. R. Evid. 1002). Rule 1003 states that duplicates of evidence
can be admitted in place of originals unless the authenticity of the original is in question (Lorraine v.
Markel Am. 2007). In determining whether secondary evidence can be included in place of an original,
Rule 1004 provides guidance.
The summary of the guidelines from the Federal Rules of Evidence cited in the Lorraine opinion
follows:
Table 1: Rules of Evidence Identified in Lorraine v. Markel as Guidance for Digital Evidence
Admissibility
Legal Guidance

Subject

Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a)
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(b)

Preliminary Questions; relationship between
judge and jury

Federal Rules of Evidence 401

Relevance

Federal Rules of Evidence 402
Federal Rules of Evidence 901

Authenticity; including examples of how to
authenticate

Federal Rules of Evidence 902

Self-Authentication; including examples

Federal Rules of Evidence 801

Hearsay; including exceptions to the hearsay

Federal Rules of Evidence 803
Federal Rules of Evidence 804
Federal Rules of Evidence 807
Federal Rules of Evidence 1001
through 1008

Original Writing Rule; also known as the “Best
Evidence Rule.” Includes use of accurate
duplicates.

Federal Rules of Evidence 403

Balance of Probative Value with Unfair
Prejudice

(Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007; LexisNexis 2007)
3.2 Applicability to State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero
The next section applies, retrospectively, digital forensic guidelines established in Lorriane v. Markel
to State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero to determine whether this would have resulted in a different
outcome. As a note, the trial portion of the Amero case preceded the Lorraine v. Markel Am. opinion
by four months in 2007. While Amero could not have capitalized on the Lorraine opinion, an analysis
helps identify knowledge the legal participants in Amero should have had to ensure the case was
properly adjudicated.
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4. ANALYSIS
4.1 Digital evidence admitted
The primary piece of digital evidence in the Amero case was the hard drive. The opinion of Judge
Grimm includes methods describing how to handle the admissibility of this type of evidence (Section
4.5).
4.2 Evaluation of digital evidence by Judge and attorney
State v. Amero is an appalling example of the blindness of the legal system when computer literacy of
the judge and lawyers is at the very low end of the spectrum. The proceedings of this case highlight
the need for even the most basic understanding of how computers operate, including the threats to
computer systems that can cause the pop-up symptoms argued by the defense. In State v. Amero, the
lawyers did not question the authenticity of expert testimony describing the behaviors of viruses and
spyware. Of more importance, the lawyers did not put forth a clear and full objection to the digital
evidence presented. The Lorraine v. Markel Am. opinion specifically states that the burden of ensuring
that digital evidence is what it purports to be depends largely on objections by opposing counsel. Thus,
it is the responsibility of lawyers to be sufficiently knowledgeable to object competently to faulty
evidence.
4.3 Expert and witness testimony
Amero provided an example of the affects expert testimony can have on a case. The numerous errors
of so-called experts swayed the outcome of this case, and further exposed the lack of basic computer
literacy among the professional legal participants. The opinion rendered in Lorraine v. Markel Am.
references examples provided by Fed. R. Evid. 901 as methods to authenticate digital evidence,
including the call for an expert witness. Laying proper foundation qualifying the expert witness, as
well as directing a competent line of questioning, rely heavily on the computer literacy of the lawyers
involved. Reliance on digital forensic “expert” witnesses was key to State v. Amero, although the line
between testimony and speculation was crossed. An objection to speculation as to whether spyware
could produce pop-up pornography would have been warranted, given that opposing counsel had some
knowledge of computer threats.
4.4 Legal precedence
Legal precedence is scarce in the area of digital evidence, although it is building. Some cases establish
sound precedence, as indicated in Lorraine. While Daubert and Frye have established general
guidance for admission of scientific evidence, the science of digital forensics is new and evolving
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow 1993; Frye v. U.S. 1923). The speed of technological change is at odds with
the time it takes for legal precedence to accumulate. This impacts every court case involving a
computer, and hardly any don’t—whether we’re talking civil cases, such as divorces, or criminal cases
where digital evidence plays a significant role. The legal system lags in handling digital evidence
adequately (Endicott, Chee, et. al. 2007). In State v. Amero, Frye and Daubert were cited in an
objection by the defense, yet neither was applied appropriately. In order to build an adequate digital
evidence curriculum for law schools, extensive review of relevant legal cases will be required. This is
a matter for future research.
4.5 Laws and regulations identified
In Amero, first the court should have determined whether a satisfactory foundation had been laid
before the jury viewed the evidence (United States v. Branch 1992; Fed. R. Evid. 104). Then relevance
should have been considered (Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402), then authenticity guided by Fed. R. Evid.
901 and 902. Application of the hearsay Rules (Fed. R. Evid. 801-807) and the Original Writing Rule
(Fed. R. Evid. 1001-1008) would follow in order to fully ensure the evidence, and duplicates of the
evidence, were what they purported to be (Lorraine v. Markel 2007).
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4.6 Legal Result
What is missing from most analyses of the Amero case is the larger picture of the emotional and health
effects on the innocent. Julie Amero, who faced forty years in jail, went through tremendous emotional
stress, and had a series of health issues arise including a tragic miscarriage (Cringely 2008). Her
family relationships were also impacted. While the legal system eventually righted the wrong inflicted
on Amero, the accumulated health and personal impacts cannot be undone. This will be repeated again
and again until we have a more predictable legal system when it comes to the use of digital evidence.
The contribution by Judge Paul W. Grimm’s opinion in Lorraine v. Markel Am. provides the basis for
guidance in this area. There are others emerging, but scant few.
5. COMPUTER AND DIGITAL FORENSICS EDUCATION RECOMMENDATIONS
State v. Amero and Lorraine v. Markel Am. provide a basis for recommending digital evidence
educational requirements in schools of law. The following recommendations will inform future
curricula for the University of Washington’s School of Law, and may be useful to others that wish to
mitigate deficiencies in computer knowledge of lawyers and the judiciary. At a minimum, the
curriculum must include:



Basic computer literacy. This includes an understanding of computer vulnerabilities.
A basic understanding that a compromised computer may show erratic actions not
performed (or intended) by the user is important and would have prevented the
Amero tragedy. This knowledge will enable lawyers to establish proper foundation
and a proper line of questioning.



Understanding of the digital forensics process. This includes basic knowledge of
how easily digital evidence can be altered and what it means to have a proper chain of
evidence, including storage and control. In addition, there should be sufficient
knowledge of how evidence is collected on a computer hard drive (and on a network),
how a hard drive is appropriately duplicated for forensic purposes, and then searched
by forensic tools. This recommendation arises from the several glaring errors in the
Amero case. It was never established that proper steps were taken to maintain a proper
chain of evidence during forensic duplication and investigation (State v. Amero 2008).
Additionally, the lack of a search for malware by police initially missed crucial
evidence.



Knowledge of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and how they apply to electronic
evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence are integral to understanding the process for
admitting digital evidence. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Insurance Co. provides a
framework for applying these rules to digital evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 901 and 902
specifically deal with authentication of digital evidence, including examples of how to
do so. This is directly relevant to the Amero case; abiding by this framework would
have provided a basis for questioning whether the digital chain of evidence was
reliable, and not broken, during the investigatory process.



Survey of case law. A thorough search for relevant cases and an extraction of
precedence should be conducted before developing digital forensics curriculum.
Knowledge of how to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as Daubert and
Frye in cases involving digital evidence will provide material for any classes
developed (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 1993; Frye v. U.S. 1923). A thorough survey of
other cases will provide and even more comprehensive understanding of the state of
the practice regarding digital evidence. Lorraine v. Markel Am. emphasizes that the
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burden of ensuring digital evidence admissibility rests largely on objections to such
evidence by opposing counsel. The inability to competently challenge testimony of
the State’s ‘expert’ witness led to a travesty of justice in the Amero case.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The above review provides insights into the legal and judicial communities’ lack of sufficient
knowledge of how to handle digital evidence appropriately and consistently. The authors believe this
argues for additional curriculum in schools of law that educate law students in the challenges of digital
evidence: digital evidence collection, chain of custody, the challenges of cybersecurity, basic computer
literacy. The authors recommend that law schools consider adding courses in these subjects as they
relate to digital evidence. A previously published digital forensics course conducted at the University
of Washington for a combined audience of technical and law students, is an example of what can be
accomplished with a collaboration between digital forensics/computer science and law faculty. Based
on a successfully and competently prosecuted case of online digital theft and compromise, the course
culminates in a moot court that requires law students to participate in the preparation and questioning
of digital forensics experts (computer science students taking the same course) (Endicott-Popovsky,
Frincke, et al. 2004). This is just the beginning of innovations that the authors recommend be
incorporated into legal education and training.
7. FUTURE WORK
Future work will involve researching existing case law in order to assist the University of
Washington’s School of Law, in partnership with the Information School, in revamping their
curriculum to include interdisciplinary courses that will improve digital evidence literacy among law
students. It is expected that a thorough analysis of cases where digital evidence has been
inappropriately handled will further refine recommendations for curriculum content made above.
Work on this project has begun, with preliminary findings discussed in this paper. Insights of a
thorough examination of case law will be disseminated broadly to the digital forensics community.
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